I do not wish to dwell on my analysis of the existential problem posed by Nietzsche in any detail. After all, if Nietzsche’s definition of the problem is clear, the solutions he suggested are both hazy and dangerous – particularly in the case of his theory of the Übermensch and the will to power, and his naturalistic, almost physical praise of ‘life’. To ‘be oneself’ and to follow one’s own law as an absolute law can certainly be a positive and legitimate option – or, rather, the only remaining option: but this is true only in the case of the human type I addressed in Ride the Tiger: an individual possessing two natures, one ‘personal’ and one transcendent. The idea of ‘being oneself’, therefore – of achieving self-realization and of severing all bonds – will have a different meaning according to what nature it is that expresses it. Transcendence (‘that which is more than life’), understood as a central and conscious element present within immanence (‘life’), provides the foundation for the existential path I outlined – a path that includes elements such as: ‘Apollonian Dionysism’ (i.e., an opening towards the most intense and diverse aspects of life, here experienced through the lucid inebriation brought about by the presence of a superior principle), impersonal activism (pure action that transcends good and evil, prospects of success or failure, happiness and unhappiness) and the challenging of oneself without any fear that the ‘I’ might suffer (internal invulnerability). The origin of some of these ideas should be self-evident to those who have followed my discussion so far.